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NOTE
A DOLLAR FOR YOUR THOUGHTS:
DOLLAR GENERAL AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
STRUGGLE WITH TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tribes have been deemed “quasi-sovereign nations”1 with a unique
amalgam of attributes, at once having a “dependent status”2 and being
“distinct, independent political communities” that retain some of their
original sovereignty.3 There are 567 federally recognized Indian tribes in
the United States, with approximately 56.2 million acres of land held in
trust by the federal government on behalf of the Indian tribes, and 326
land areas administered as Indian reservations.4 It is inevitable that nonIndian, non-member businesses, and individuals will travel through, live
on, establish businesses on, fish or hunt on, and even commit crimes or
torts on these lands.5
For as long as the United States has existed, the federal government
and the Indian tribes have had a complicated relationship.6 The policies
toward these tribes have fluctuated from one extreme to another, from
elimination to self-determination.7 Justice Marshall once noted that the
legislature’s authority over tribal matters is extremely broad, and as
such, the role of courts in interfering in tribal affairs ought to be
restrained.8 Yet when it comes to non-members, interference in tribal
legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction has become quite common in
1.
2.
3.
4.

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978).
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
Frequently Asked Questions: Why Tribes Exist Today in the United States, U.S. DEP’T
INTERIOR INDIAN AFF., http://www.bia.gov/FAQs (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
5. See, e.g., State v. A–1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442, 457-59 (1997); Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-67 (1981); Transcript of Oral Argument at 40-63, Dollar Gen. Corp. v.
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
6. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 48-50 (1982).
7. M. Gatsby Miller, Note, The Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over
Nonmembers in Civil Cases, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1825, 1829-31 (2014).
8. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
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the past few decades.9 In the past twenty-nine years, the Supreme Court
has ruled against tribal interests in seventy-two percent of the fifty-five
cases heard.10 The Roberts Court has considered four cases in the past
year alone.11
Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians12
was shaping up to be the most far-reaching of these cases.13 Dollar
General signed a multi-year lease and opened up a store in a shopping
plaza managed by a tribal-run company on the Mississippi Choctaw
reservation in 2000.14 Pursuant to a business license issued under the
Choctaw Code, Dollar General consented to tribal court jurisdiction for
matters arising out of the lease.15 The tribe operated a youth job-training
program, placing young tribe members in positions with local businesses
and paying them for the work done under the supervision of the
business.16 In 2003, a teenager employed by Dollar General through this
program claimed that the store manager, a non-tribal employee, sexually
assaulted him while working in the store.17 Since the manager never
faced any criminal repercussions, the teenager and his family ultimately
sued Dollar General in tribal court.18 Despite a consensual business
relationship with the tribe, Dollar General contested the tribal court’s
ability to exercise jurisdiction on four separate occasions.19 Each
time, its argument was rejected, until Dollar General appealed to the
Supreme Court.20
This Note argues that the Supreme Court’s line of precedent since
the 1970s both contains and relies upon flawed reasoning and
assumptions regarding the historical position of the tribes in relation to
the federal government and tribal courts’ ability to adjudicate matters

9. Miller, supra note 7, at 1831-37.
10. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Indian Cases at the Court, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 4, 2016, 9:48 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/scotus-for-law-students-indian-casesat-the-court.
11. Id.
12. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
13. Wermiel, supra note 10.
14. Ed Gehres, Argument Preview: The Future of Tribal Courts — The Power to Adjudicate
Civil Torts Involving Non-Indians, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 30, 2015, 9:45 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/argument-preview-the-future-of-tribal-courts-the-power-toadjudicate-civil-torts-involving-non-indian.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Lisa Nagele-Piazza, High Court Upholds Tribal Jurisdiction in Dollar General Case,
SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. (June 24, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/
legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/tribal-jurisdiction-dollar-general.aspx.
18. Gehres, supra note 14.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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concerning non-members without violating due process.21 These
fundamentally flawed conclusions are not only a means for the
Supreme Court to interfere with tribal matters and in effect diminish
tribal sovereignty, they also ultimately conflict with principles of
international law.22
Part II of this Note elaborates generally on the historical
relationship between the tribes and the federal government from early
American history through the era of self-determination, which began in
the 1960s and continues today.23 It addresses the major decisions coming
out of the Supreme Court that have drastically limited the ability of the
tribal courts to assert jurisdiction over non-members within their
territory, and summarizes the general circumstances of tribal civil
jurisdiction as they existed at the time the Supreme Court agreed to hear
Dollar General.24 Part III of this Note explains the unique outcome of
Dollar General, the underlying unresolved issues that both contributed
to the case coming before the Court and some of the issues that remain
afterward, and the impact of such concerns on tribal courts and tribal
sovereignty, as well as non-members who interact with the tribes.25
Finally, Part IV of this Note explains how Dollar General ought to have
been decided if the Supreme Court had a full bench, and how the Court
should approach civil divestiture cases in the future to resolve the
uncertainty in its own precedent, comport more with fundamental
principles of international law, and restore some of the sovereignty the
tribes historically possessed.26
II. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS, FEDERAL COURTS,
AND THE TRIBES
The relationship between the federal government and the tribes is
complex.27 From the early colonial era, to the adoption of the
Constitution and beyond, the policies of the European “discoverers” and,
later, the federal government, have fluctuated.28 The recent Dollar
General case is a culmination of all that has come before it; the next
logical step from the path that Indian law has taken over the years.29 This
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Stephen Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st
Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217, 275-80, 287-94 (1994); see infra Part II.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6 (noting six
different eras in Indian law).
29. See infra Part II.B–C.
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Part first discusses the policies surrounding European-Native and early
American-Native relations and the dramatic shift in how the tribes were
perceived by the United States.30 Next, this Part discusses the significant
case law that has been developed by the Supreme Court as a result of
this perception of the Indian Nations.31 This Part also explains the state
of tribal court authority to exercise civil jurisdiction and, by extension,
tribal sovereignty before the Dollar General case.32
A. Early Federal Policies
Relations between the tribes and the European powers and colonies
leading up to the American Revolution were those as between two
sovereign nations.33 From the time of first contact between the tribes and
the Europeans, relations were conducted formally through the creation of
treaties.34 The view was that the Indian tribes had exclusive jurisdiction
over their lands, with the corresponding legal rights to property and selfgovernment; and as such, relations should be conducted in this manner.35
When the colonies became more established, however, England was
concerned that the colonists would become overeager to take over Indian
lands without negotiation or compensation, contrary to the settled policy
of the European powers.36 The Crown thus issued a Royal Proclamation
in 1763, voiding any treaties or land purchases made by any individuals
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part II.C.
33. McSloy, supra note 22, at 228.
34. Id.
35. See Amy Conners, Note, The Scalpel and the Ax: Federal Review of Tribal Decisions in
the Interest of Tribal Sovereignty, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 199, 210 (2012); see also
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 50-52 (discussing Francisco de
Vitoria, a Roman Catholic philosopher and one of the fundamental contributors to theories of
human rights and self-determination, which formed the foundation of the relationship between
Native Americans and European nations). de Vitoria’s analysis established the principle that before
Europeans could legally acquire lands or dominion over Indian tribes, the tribes must first give their
consent. Id. at 50. Pope Paul III incorporated de Vitoria’s principle in the Sublimis Deus in 1537,
which stated:
[T]he said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by
no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though
they be outside the faith of Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely and
legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the possession of their property; nor should they be
in any way enslaved; should the contrary happen, it shall be null and of no effect.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 52 n.15 (quoting FRANCIS
AUGUSTUS MACNUTT, BARTHOLOMEW DE LAS CASAS 429 (Arthur H. Clark Co. 1909)).
Substantially similar language may be found in the Northwest Ordinance enacted by the Continental
Congress and reenacted by the U.S. Congress. See id. at 108 n.383.
36. McSloy, supra note 22, at 234. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of discovery as it
was applied toward the Indian tribes, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 545, 572-73,
591-92 (1823).
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or the colonies unless they were approved by the Crown, and effectively
centralized the power to conduct relations with the tribes.37
A similarly centralized policy was adopted by the framers of the
Constitution.38 Among the federal government’s enumerated powers are
the ability to establish treaties39 and regulate commerce with the tribes.40
Treatymaking, a power belonging solely to the federal government,
continued to be the main means of interacting with the tribes.41 The aim
of the two provisions regarding tribal affairs was to ensure that the
federal government had the enumerated power to conduct relations
between the government and the tribes, not the states.42
Perhaps the most significant early contribution to case law
regarding the tribal nations’ status can be found in Chief Justice
Marshall’s trio of cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh,43 Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,44 and Worcester v. Georgia.45 First, per the Supreme Court, the
doctrine of discovery could be applied to the lands occupied by the
tribes, justified in part on the basis of race, because of the “character and
habits of the [Indians].”46 Second, the Court nevertheless held that the
only limitation on the tribes’ sovereignty was that the tribes could not
sell or give away land at will to whomever they pleased.47 Less than a
decade later, the Court went further: although the Cherokee Nation was
recognized by the federal government as a state, the Indian tribes could
not be deemed foreign nations; rather, the tribes were “domestic
dependent nations”—a legal fiction newly invented by the Court.48 The
37. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 548 (1832). A similar policy was adopted by
the federal government. See An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch.
33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012)).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
40. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN
INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 45-47 (1988) (indicating that treaties between the federal
government and the tribes were concluded in the same manner as treaties between the federal
government and a foreign sovereign).
42. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1831).
43. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
44. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1.
45. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
46. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589. The doctrine of discovery, a “principle of universal
law” according to the Court, had traditionally meant that legal title in vacant land vested in the
discovering country. Id. at 595.
47. Id. at 574. This limitation would later be relied upon by the Court as a means of justifying
its theory of implicit divestiture. See John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes
from the Cohen’s Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731, 736-40 (2006).
48. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16-17. The Court, at the time, failed to further
elaborate on exactly what the term “domestic dependent nations” meant, but in a later case, the
Court determined that the ability of the federal government to exert power over the tribes was
“necessary [for] their protection” and described the tribes as “wards” and “communities dependent

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 17

404

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:399

Court then backtracked a year later in Worcester.49 As in the earlier
cases, the Court was required to resolve whether the State of Georgia
could impose its laws upon the Cherokee Nation.50 Marshall, relying on
principles of international law, determined that the tribes were
“independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial.”51 The tribes, therefore, have an inherent and complete
sovereignty over those lands, including the ability to self-govern, such
that the government has no authority to interfere with the tribal affairs.52
Although the Worcester decision was ultimately unenforced,53 Chief
Justice Marshall’s description of the Indian tribes’ position in relation to
both the states and the federal government to this day remains some of
the strongest language in support of tribal sovereignty.54
A major shift in federal-tribal relations developed in tandem with
westward expansion under the notion of manifest destiny.55 The
expansion was gradual at first, but when the Gold Rush hit in 1848, the
movement west became explosive.56 At the same time, dominion over
relations between the federal government and the Native Americans was
on the United States.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886).
49. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
50. Id. at 542.
51. Id. at 559-60. Chief Justice Marshall further stated:
The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be
the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the
Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable
of making treaties. The words “treaty” and “nation” are words of our own language,
selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a
definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have
applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.
Id. (emphasis added).
52. See id. at 547-48. Chief Justice Marshall has explained:
[O]ur history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our country, of any
attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the internal affairs of the
Indians . . . . The king purchased their lands when they were willing to sell, at a price
they were willing to take; but never coerced a surrender of them. He . . . never intruded
into the interior of their affairs, or interfered with their self-government.
Id. at 547. Note that Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis of the colonial powers’ interactions with the
tribes is consistent with the re-vamped doctrine of discovery in which certain exclusive rights, but
not possessory rights, were vested in the first European power to “discover” the particular area of
occupied land, including the ability to enter into treaties with and purchase lands from the tribes.
See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572-74 (1823).
53. McSloy, supra note 22, at 239. The decision in Worcester was politically unpopular and
in the aftermath, the Cherokee people were forcefully removed from their lands and traveled west
along the infamous “Trail of Tears.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6
at 83-84, 91-92.
54. See McSloy, supra note 22, at 244-50.
55. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 101-35 (1970).
56. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 97.
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transferred from the War Department to the Department of the Interior.57
During this period, the House of Representatives successfully inserted
itself into Indian affairs, a province that once belonged solely to the
Senate and the Executive.58 In 1871, a rider was attached to an
appropriations bill which declared that the tribes would no longer be
recognized as independent nations, with whom the federal government
could engage with in treaty-making.59 The inevitable implication of
these actions, of course, was to diminish the view of federal-tribal
relations as an international issue; rather, the tribes became a unique
political entity, less than sovereign, located within the territory of the
United States.60
B. Implicit Divestiture and Significant Supreme Court Decisions
Affecting Tribal Civil Jurisdiction
Once Congress seized the authority over tribal affairs as a domestic
issue, it proceeded to use this power to interfere with the internal affairs
of the tribes, with the Supreme Court’s support.61 The Court has held
that the acts of Congress were not authorized under any provision of the
57. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 5, 9 Stat. 395 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). The fact
that the responsibility over Indian affairs had been in the hands of the War Department since 1789
only reaffirms the recognition that such affairs were of an international nature. See RUSSEL
LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND
POLITICAL LIBERTY 34-35 (1980).
58. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 202 (1975).
59. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71); see also
BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 57, at 68 n.36 (explaining that existing treaties with the tribes
were not affected); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 6, at 127-28 (same).
This law was arguably unconstitutional because it interferes with the Executive’s capacity to enter
into treaties, though the Supreme Court has never ruled so, leading to the sudden shift in policy in
1886. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382, 384-85 (1886) (“[A]fter an experience of a
hundred years of the treaty-making system of government, Congress has determined upon a new
departure—to govern [Indians] by acts of Congress.”); BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 57, at 6869 (discussing the difference between the two policies and its impact on the role of the Supreme
Court). For instance, “[t]reaties, like contracts, are unenforceable except against those agreeing
specifically and expressly to be bound by them. Legislation, however, is presumed to be legitimate
when enacted, and enforceable against all persons within the power of the legislature.” BARSH &
HENDERSON, supra note 57, at 69.
60. See 25 U.S.C. § 71; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note
6, at 106-07; Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1518-19 (2013) (discussing how interference by Congress through the
allotment program in the 1880s and the termination movement of the 1950s served to diminish tribal
sovereignty by taking tribal lands out of the hands of the tribal governments).
61. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 79-83. Even with the Trail of Tears and the Dawes Act, both of
which seriously diminished the amount of land that was considered to be in the tribes’ possession,
the notion expressed by the Court in Worcester remained good law—the tribes may exert complete
sovereignty over their land. See Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)
(repealed 2000).
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Constitution.62 Searching for a legitimate basis of Congress’s power to
legislate, the Court instead turned to judicially constructed limitations on
the tribes’ sovereign powers.63
Although the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that Congress
has “plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local
self-government which the tribes otherwise possess,”64 beginning in the
1970s, federal courts adopted the role of determining when the tribes’
status as “dependent nations” limited their sovereignty and by extension
their ability to exercise authority over non-members on their land.65
According to the Court, when the tribes were incorporated into the
territory of the United States, they accepted its protection.66 This
incorporation correspondingly implicitly divested them of some of the
original sovereignty which they had once exercised.67 As for the powers
that still belonged to the tribes, the Court determined that any “aspects of
sovereignty” that had not been taken away by treaty or by statute, or
even by implication due to their “dependent status” belonged to the
tribes.68 The ability to exercise jurisdiction over relations between tribal
members and non-members was one of these powers that was implicitly
divested.69 This was a decisive turn from the Court that declared that
tribal governments have inherent sovereignty over activities that happen
on their lands, regardless of whether non-members were involved
or not.70
In conjunction with the Wheeler decision in 1978,71 the Supreme
Court declared that same year that private individuals had no cause of

62. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-80. The legislative power of Congress over the tribes was
nevertheless upheld, despite there being no constitutional basis for that power. See id. at 384-85.
63. LaVelle, supra note 47, at 732-34.
64. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); see Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376, 384 (1896). For a discussion on why this assumption by the Court contradicts history,
principles of international law, and even the Court’s own precedent see McSloy, supra note 22, at
278-79.
65. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194-95 (1978). Beginning with
Oliphant, for the first time in more than 150 years, the Supreme Court began adding powers to the
list of those that were implicitly divested when the tribes were deemed domestic dependent nations
within the United States. See Conners, supra note 35, at 215-16.
66. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
67. Id. To get a sense of the implicit divestiture theory in its early stages of development, see
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379-84.
68. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. The view that certain aspects of sovereignty were “taken” by
treaty or statute directly contradicts the principle of international law that any rights or powers that
are not granted by one sovereign nation to a treaty to the other are retained by the granting party.
See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1905); McSloy, supra note 22, at 264.
69. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
70. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20, 223 (1959); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 553-55 (1832).
71. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.
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action against tribal courts under the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”).72
Before this decision, non-members were free to bring an action against
the tribes and their courts in federal court and argue that in that
particular case, extending the exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction would
result in a violation of due process under the ICRA.73 But, thanks to the
ruling in Martinez, non-members who faced subjection to tribal courts
for incidents that arose on tribal lands instead pleaded to the federal
courts that the tribal courts’ civil jurisdiction simply does not exist in the
first place.74 Hence, the development of Montana75 and its progeny.76
In 1981, tribal civil jurisdiction, and therefore tribal sovereignty,
was dealt a major blow.77 The Supreme Court held that there was no
suggestion in the history of legislative policies that Congress intended
that non-Indians settled on allotted lands be subject to tribal regulatory
or adjudicative authority.78 In fact, without express congressional
delegation, there was a presumption that the tribes’ inherent sovereign
powers do not extend to the activities of non-members.79 However, the
Court also identified two exceptions to this presumption where civil
jurisdiction is concerned: (1) the tribes may regulate the activities of
non-members who have entered into deliberate relationships with the
tribes or its members through contracts, leases, or other commercial
dealing; and (2) the tribes retain the power to exercise jurisdiction over
non-members’ conduct when that conduct endangers or has some direct
impact on the tribes’ political integrity, economic security, or health and
welfare. 80 Since this decision was handed down, however, the Court has
narrowed, redefined, and even completely ignored the implicit
divestiture doctrine.81
72. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1978); see Pub. L. 90-284, § 202, 82
Stat. 77, 78 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2012)).
73. See § 202, 82 Stat. at 77-78.
74. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72; Conners, supra note 35, at 226-27. This was in spite of the fact
that the Court acknowledged that “[t]ribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests
of both Indians and non-Indians.” Martinez, 436 U.S. at 65.
75. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
76. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316
(2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987);
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1977). These cases are sometimes referred to generally as the “civil
divestiture” cases. See Conners, supra note 35, at 222, 227.
77. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-67.
78. Id. at 557-58. The Supreme Court had already determined a few years prior that the tribal
courts did not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who had committed crimes on
their lands. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
79. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
80. Id. at 565-66.
81. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 18 (avoiding the implicit divestiture question);
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Soon after Montana, the Court defined the cause of action that nonmembers could turn to as a means of escaping tribal civil jurisdiction.82
Non-members, having a general right against a tribal court’s unlawful
exercise of power, do not need a statute to expressly create a right of
action; instead, the Court must determine whether the tribes implicitly
divested their power to assert jurisdiction over non-members.83 Yet, just
two years later, the Court ignored the implicit divestiture doctrine,
instead stating that the tribes retain all sovereignty over their territory
that has not been explicitly withdrawn by federal statute or treaty.84
More importantly, the Court held that tribal courts’ civil jurisdiction
over non-members was precisely one such form of sovereignty that
presumptively remained in the tribal courts.85 Later, the Court reversed
itself; now, instead of retaining civil jurisdiction over non-members
unless explicitly withdrawn, the tribal courts could only assert
jurisdiction over the activities of non-members in limited circumstances
unless they were expressly granted that authority by treaty or federal
statute.86 In a magnificent acrobatic feat, the Court in Strate was careful
to reiterate its precedent so as to not be misinterpreted by the lower
courts in the future: the tribal courts only have presumptive jurisdiction
where the tribes possess the power to regulate the activity of nonmembers.87 The Court distinguished between the tribes’ adjudicative
authority and their legislative authority, and held that their adjudicative
jurisdiction does not exceed their authority to regulate the conduct of
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 856-57 (same); Strate, 520 U.S. at 442 (same). The
decision in Strate in particular indicated a departure from the principles set forth in Montana while
at the same time declaring that it was not stating anything new. 520 U.S. at 453. The Court held that
subject to any controlling treaties or statutes, as well as the two exceptions identified in the Montana
decision, the civil authority of the tribes, and the jurisdiction of its courts, “generally ‘does not
extend to the activities of non-members of the tribe.’” Id. at 453 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at
565); see infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text; see also Curtis G. Berkey, International Law
and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
65, 72 (1992). Professor Berkey explained: “The Supreme Court has struggled, with mixed results,
to apply the implicit divestiture rule consistently. The Court appears to be confused about the
meaning and scope of the rule.” Id.; see, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 14647, 147 n.13 (1982) (following the implicit divestiture doctrine as defined in Colville, not as it was
defined in Montana); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 153 (1980) (redefining divestiture to apply “where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be
inconsistent with the overriding interests” of the federal government).
82. See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 852-53, 855-57.
83. See id. at 850-53; see also David A. Castleman, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal
Courts, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1253, 1278-79 (2006) (analyzing the cause of action whereby nonmembers could directly attack the adjudicatory power of the tribal courts).
84. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 14.
85. Id. at 18. The Court further explained that in cases where federal statute or treaty is silent,
the tribal courts’ power remains intact. Id.
86. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 445.
87. See id. at 453.
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non-members.88 This, of course, left the question open whether the
tribes’ adjudicatory authority was concurrent with their regulatory
authority, a question that remains unanswered today.89
C. Where Things Stood Before Dollar General
The more recent actions taken by Congress and the executive
branch differ markedly from the federal courts’ apparent eagerness to
interfere with tribal courts.90 For example, since the major cases limiting
tribal civil jurisdiction were decided, Congress passed both the Tribal
Law and Order Act91 and the Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal
Assistance Act (“Tribal Justice Act”).92 The purpose of the Tribal Law
and Order Act was to strengthen tribal law enforcement by expanding
the authority for tribal justice systems to prosecute and punish criminals
and encourage intergovernmental collaboration between tribal, federal,
state, and local governments.93 The Tribal Justice Act was initially
enacted in 2000, upon the finding that “enhancing tribal court systems
and improving access to those systems serves the dual Federal goals of
tribal political self-determination and economic self-sufficiency.”94 If
anything, these statutes reaffirm the legislature’s support for, and faith
in, the tribal courts as the most appropriate forums for handling disputes
affecting personal and property rights on tribal lands.95 The very purpose
of these laws contradicts the precedent set by the Court diminishing the
tribal courts’ adjudicatory power.96
88. See id.
89. See generally Miller, supra note 7. Miller indicates that in two of the Supreme Court’s
most recent divestiture cases, Hicks and Plains Commerce Bank, the Court explicitly avoided
deciding whether the tribes’ two powers were coextensive, and even identifying the scope of tribal
adjudicatory power in certain cases by determining that the tribes lacked the ability to regulate the
underlying issue in the first place. Id. at 1835-37.
90. See supra Part II.B.
91. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258, 2261-301
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. (2012)).
92. Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-559,
114 Stat. 2778 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 3651).
93. Tribal Law and Order Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/tribal/tribal-lawand-order-act (last updated Oct. 20, 2016).
94. 25 U.S.C. § 3651(7).
95. Id. § 3651(6).
96. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 320 (2008);
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that its own precedent once guarded the authority of
tribes over their own land. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (attributing the source of
the tribal governments’ general sovereignty over their land and respect for that sovereignty to
treaties entered into by the United States). The Court once expressed that the inherent power of the
tribes could only be taken away by an explicit action from Congress. Id. Of course, even this view
of Congress’s general ability to legislate the tribes’ powers away cannot find support in the
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As of the time Dollar General came before the Supreme Court, the
Court had never ruled in favor of the tribal courts where civil jurisdiction
was involved.97 Nor has the Court explained exactly what non-member
activity would fall under one of the two Montana exceptions, or whether
the tribes’ regulatory authority over non-member activity and their
corresponding adjudicatory authority are concurrent.98 As the civil
divestiture cases suggest, it is incredibly difficult to meet either
of the Montana exceptions, and the Court has disagreed whether the
main focus should be on the ownership of land or on the status of the
parties involved.99
The most recent civil divestiture case, Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land & Cattle Co., seemed to indicate a shift in the Court’s
analysis in divestiture cases.100 Although Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
on behalf of the Court did continue to use land ownership status as a
significant factor, it incorporated aspects from Justice Souter’s two
major concurrences in Atkinson101 and Hicks102 into civil divestiture
jurisprudence.103 In analyzing Montana’s general rule, the Chief Justice
indicated that due process concerns justified the limitations imposed on
tribal regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction: allowing tribal regulation
of the sale of fee land in this case risked subjecting non-members to
tribal authority “without commensurate consent” because non-members

Constitution. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886).
97. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 320; Hicks, 533 U.S. at 369; Strate, 520 U.S. at
456-59; Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19-20 (1987); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985).
98. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. 329-36 (finding that the sale of non-Indian fee land on a
reservation by a non-Indian bank did not fall within the exceptions and avoiding the adjudicatory
power question by holding that the tribal court lacked the underlying regulatory power regarding the
plaintiffs’ discrimination claim); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654-59 (2001)
(ruling that non-member receipt of tribal services did not justify the tribal tax imposed on a hotel
owned by non-members on tribal land and therefore did not meet either Montana exception); Hicks,
533 U.S. at 355-56, 364 (holding that neither exception applied when the tribal court attempted to
exercise jurisdiction over state officials who had allegedly executed a search warrant against a tribal
member on tribal land illegally and explicitly avoiding the question of whether the tribes’ two
powers were coextensive); Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-59 (holding that a car accident involving nonmembers on a right of way through tribal land did not fall under either of the Montana exceptions).
99. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359-60 (ownership of land is just one factor and the Montana rule
applies to both tribal and non-tribal land). Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Hicks urged that
the focus should instead be on the “character of the individual over whom jurisdiction is claimed.”
Id. at 381 (Souter, J., concurring).
100. See 554 U.S. 316.
101. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 659-60 (Souter, J., concurring).
102. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 375-86 (Souter, J., concurring).
103. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337-38; see also Jesse Sixkiller, Note,
Procedural Fairness: Ensuring Tribal Civil Jurisdiction After Plains Commerce Bank, 26 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 779, 792-97 (2009).
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do not participate in tribal government.104 As such, non-members should
only be subject to tribal jurisdiction if the non-member has consented
“either expressly or by his actions.”105 Chief Justice Roberts also
appeared to conflate the two Montana exceptions, explaining that for the
non-members who have consensual relationships with the tribes through
leases or contracts, their activities could only be regulated to the extent
necessary to protect tribal self-government and control the tribes’
internal relations.106 Although the statement was dictum, it is suggestive
that the Court would be willing to narrow the Montana rule even further,
virtually into oblivion.107
III.

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS, REGULATORY VERSUS ADJUDICATORY
AUTHORITY, AND THE WEAKENING OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

The frequency with which the Roberts Court took up issues relating
to tribal civil jurisdiction and the general inconsistency in the Court’s
decisions over the years meant that it was only a matter of time before
another civil jurisdiction case came before the Court.108 This Part first
discusses the underlying facts and procedural history of the Dollar
General case.109 Next, this Part addresses the still lingering question
whether the tribes’ adjudicatory authority extends as far as their
legislative authority in the context of Dollar General, and how in this
regard the tribal nations are treated differently from every other
104. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337. If the Court cannot find strong footing for
denying tribal jurisdiction on the grounds of overriding state or federal interests, the Court
frequently turns to due process considerations to justify implicit divestiture of the tribes’ powers.
See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. at 153-54 (1980) (holding that divestiture may be found in instances when the tribes seek
to subject non-members to “tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of the Bill of
Rights,” inconsistent with the overriding interests of the federal government).
105. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337. It is worth noting here that, ironically, Justice
Souter actually joined in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in this case, despite the fact that the majority
opinion incorporated some of Justice Souter’s earlier arguments. Id. at 342-52 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg argued that the bank had a lengthy
relationship with the tribe and could not reasonably argue that it was unaware of tribal law or tribal
court procedures. Id. at 346, 351 n.3. Furthermore, she suggested that the discrimination claim
involved in the case was not based solely on unwritten tribal custom, as the majority suggested, but
was based on both state and federal discrimination law, as many tribal courts actually borrow law
from both the states and federal government. Id.; see Sixkiller, supra note 103, at 803-04.
106. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 332.
107. See Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 178-79, 179 n.5
(5th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom., Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians, 125 S. Ct. 2833 (2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (arguing that the
federal courts were required to apply the Court’s dicta in the Plains Commerce Bank case, and as
such, the Choctaw tribal court could not be deemed to have authority over Dollar General).
108. See supra Part II.B–C.
109. See infra Part III.A.
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sovereign nation.110 This Part also examines how this question of
legislative and adjudicatory power is more or less a mask for the
Supreme Court’s concern for non-members’ due process rights.111 In
addition, this Part explains the circumstances leading up to and the
rather unique outcome of the Dollar General case.112 Finally, this Part
discusses how some of the unresolved issues after the case can impact
both the tribal courts and non-member parties going forward.113
A. The Dollar General Case
Dollar General owned and operated a store on Choctaw reservation
land held by the United States in trust for the tribe, pursuant to a lease
agreement with the tribe and a business license issued by the tribe.114 In
2003, the store manager, Dale Townsend, agreed to participate in the
Youth Opportunity Program, developed by the tribe to place young tribe
members in summer employment positions.115 John Doe (“Doe”), a
thirteen-year-old tribe member who was placed at the store, sued both
Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court, alleging that Townsend
sexually assaulted him while he was working there.116 Both Townsend
and Dollar General filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, which the tribal court subsequently denied.117 Their
petitions for interlocutory review to the Choctaw Supreme Court were
also denied.118
After exhausting their options, Townsend and Dollar General filed
suit in federal court in 2008, seeking an injunction to prevent the suit
from being carried out in tribal court.119 Although the district court
granted Townsend’s motion, Dollar General’s motion was rejected
because Doe performed services of value to Dollar General, who in turn
enjoyed a commercial benefit from its agreement to participate in the
Youth Opportunity Program.120 The conclusion might be drawn that a

110. See infra Part III.B.
111. See infra Part III.C.
112. See infra Part III.D.
113. See infra Part III.E.
114. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2014),
cert. granted sub nom., Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 125 S. Ct. 2833
(2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 169-70.
120. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 846 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653-54 (S. Dist.
Miss. 2011), aff’d, 746 F.3d 167, cert. granted sub nom., Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians, 125 S. Ct. 2833 (2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
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consensual relationship existed between the tribe and the store, and as
such, Montana’s first exception applied.121 Upon granting the tribe’s
motion for summary judgment, the court explained that as a
consequence of the arrangement with the tribe, Dollar General
had implicitly acquiesced to tribal jurisdiction over matters concerning
this relationship.122
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Dollar General’s arguments were yet
again rejected.123 The court determined that the relationship between the
store, Doe, and the tribe, was unquestionably of a commercial nature,
and even if it were noncommercial, the court did not find that the first
Montana exception precluded noncommercial relationships from ever
giving rise to tribal jurisdiction.124 Although the Supreme Court had
narrowed the Montana decision to require that the tribal regulation must
have some connection to the consensual relationship itself, the Fifth
Circuit determined that tribal jurisdiction over non-members was
nevertheless an “important part of tribal sovereignty.”125 If the tribe
retained the power to regulate specific conduct of non-members, it did
not make a difference whether it was through “precisely tailored
regulations or through tort claims.”126 The Fifth Circuit determined that
the tribe was acting within its regulatory authority in insisting upon a
child member’s safety by placing him in a workplace on tribal land, and
that there was an obvious nexus between the conduct for which Doe
sought compensation and the store’s participation in the youth
employment program.127 Dollar General’s argument that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Plains Commerce required an additional showing by
the tribes that the specific relationship at issue between the parties itself
intrudes on the tribes’ internal affairs or threatens the tribes’ self-

121. Id.
122. Id. at 650. Perhaps, most importantly, the court interpreted Montana as reflecting “a legal
presumption that it would materially undermine tribal rights of self-government to deprive tribal
courts of jurisdiction in general as an exercise of tribal sovereignty to adjudicate such claims.” Id. at
653-54.
123. See Dolgencorp, Inc., 746 F.3d at 169.
124. Id. at 173.
125. Id. at 172-73 (quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001)).
126. Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 609 F.3d 927, 938
(8th Cir. 2010). If a court is examining tribal regulation through tort law, the court, in applying
Montana, should focus its consideration on the specific alleged conduct of the non-member, and
take a “functional view of the regulatory effect of the claim on the nonmember.” Id.
127. Dolgencorp, Inc., 746 F.3d at 173-74. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit also discussed the
element of foreseeability, a factor that is considered when weighing personal jurisdiction. Id. at 174.
The Fifth Circuit held that because Dollar General “agreed to place a minor tribe member in a
position of quasi-employment” on tribal land then it would be absurd for Dollar General to claim
surprise if it was required to “answer in tribal court for harm caused to the child in the course of his
employment.” Id.
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government was also rejected.128 From the Fifth Circuit’s perspective,
not only was the Court’s language in Plains Commerce dicta, it also
indicated that, in a general sense, the tribe’s ability to regulate the
working conditions of its members employed on reservation land was
central to its self-government.129
Dollar General’s last hope laid with the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari in 2015.130 Notably, the United States did step in as an
amicus curiae on behalf of the respondents, and defended the tribes’
authority to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members,131 as did a
group of historians and legal scholars.132 The United States asserted that
the Court should refuse to accept Dollar General’s plea for a rule that
tribes lack jurisdiction over all civil claims against non-members
because Congress has relied on the Court’s jurisprudence “in supporting
tribal courts as ‘the most appropriate forums for the adjudication of
disputes affecting personal and property rights on Native lands.’”133 The
fact that at least four Justices were willing to consider the issue, given
that it would involve applying somewhat settled law to the relatively
narrow facts of the case, suggests that the Court was prepared to go even
further in civil divestiture jurisprudence.134
B. Whether Tribal Regulatory Authority Is Concurrent with Its
Adjudicatory Authority
The primary question to be considered in Dollar General was
whether the presumption of the tribe’s legislative authority to regulate
the activity of non-members is concurrent with its ability to
adjudicate matters that fall within their regulatory schemes.135 Prior to
hearing this case, the Court had skillfully skirted answering this precise
128. Id. at 175.
129. Id. The Fifth Circuit emphasized the fact that the alleged conduct involved tort law, and in
particular, the sexual molestation of a minor, and even hinted that Montana’s second exception—
where the tribe’s health and safety is at stake—was met. Id.
130. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 135 S. Ct. 2833 (2015), aff’d per
curiam, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016). The Court agreed to hear the case despite the Solicitor General
recommending otherwise. Noah Feldman, Dollar General Tries to Shake Up Tribal Law,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2015, 11:56 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-1207/dollar-general-tries-to-shake-up-tribal-law.
131. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, 7, Dollar Gen.
Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496).
132. See Brief for Amici Curiae Historians and Legal Scholars Gregory Ablavsky, Bethany R.
Berger, Ned Blackhawk, Daniel Carpenter, Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Maggie McKinley, and Joseph
William Singer in Support of Respondents at 1-2, 4-8, Dollar Gen. Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 131496) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae Historians and Legal Scholars].
133. Id. at 10-11 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 3651(6) (2012)).
134. See Feldman, supra note 130.
135. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 3-4.
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question, leaving tribal governments, scholars, and even other federal
courts to wonder whether the tribes’ adjudicatory power was coextensive
with its ability to legislate and regulate.136 It is worth noting that
neither the states nor the federal government face this sort of division
between their regulatory powers and their courts’ corresponding
adjudicatory powers.137
The principles of a sovereign’s ability to assert its authority are
governed by norms of international law.138 These principles recognize
that the sovereign’s legislative jurisdiction and its adjudicatory
jurisdiction are two different things, but that a nation’s power to exercise
the latter is normally broader.139 Montana addressed a rather narrow
question: the authority of the tribal government to pass ordinances—an
exercise of legislative or regulatory jurisdiction—over non-members, but
the holding of the Court used language that broadly encompassed tribal
authority over non-members in general (including adjudicative
jurisdiction).140 The new problem was whether the ability to regulate a
non-member’s activity necessitates the ability to exercise judicial power
over that individual subject to that regulation.141 Essentially, by linking
the tribal courts’ adjudicatory jurisdiction to the tribe’s regulatory (or
legislative) jurisdiction, the Court treated the tribal courts’ jurisdiction
and by extension, its sovereignty, as something equivalent to a “federal
agency with administrative courts,” rather than as a “state sovereign with
its own common law courts.”142

136. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 320
(2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442
(1997).
137. Miller, supra note 7, at 1837.
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 401 (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).
139. See Florey, supra note 60, at 1508; see also Catherine T. Struve, How Bad Law Made a
Hard Case Easy: Nevada v. Hicks and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts, 5 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 288, 298 (2003) (indicating that a sovereign’s adjudicatory power, or the ability to
subject persons or things to its courts is “presumed to reach well beyond that government’s
regulatory power”).
140. Florey, supra note 60, at 1523-24. It was not until Strate that the Court officially extended
application of the Montana rule to tribal courts’ adjudicative jurisdiction, thereby linking the two
types of tribal jurisdiction: “tribal judicial jurisdiction was at any rate no broader than the legislative
powers at issue in Montana.” Id. at 1526 (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 453).
141. Miller, supra note 7, at 1835-36. The Strate Court determined that the tribe must first
have the power to pass regulations regarding the specific non-member conduct at issue before the
tribal courts can exercise power over determining that individual’s rights and obligations. Id.
142. Alfred R. Light, Sovereignty Myths and Intergovernmental Realities: The Etiquette of
Tribal Federalism, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 373, 392 (2001).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 17

416

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:399

C. Procedural Due Process as a Guise for Diminishing Tribal
Courts’ Authority
Outside of determining the extent of tribal adjudicatory authority,
Dollar General and at least four of the Justices adopted the stance that
allowing non-members to be haled into tribal courts, referred to by
Justice Kennedy as “nonconstitutional forums,” would violate
procedural due process.143 Yet, as Justice Breyer highlights, if an
American went to Tasmania, with a deliberate relationship with that
forum, and ultimately litigated and received a reasonable judgment
there, the United States courts would enforce that decision.144 Whereas
the traditional rule required federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
to refrain from interfering with tribal authority over tribal territory to a
significant degree in order to avoid encroaching upon tribal sovereignty,
the Court has increasingly justified interference with tribal authority in
order to protect non-member litigants’ personal liberties.145
The primary concern for the Supreme Court appears to be that nonmembers do not participate in tribal government, and as such, have not
necessarily consented to tribal jurisdiction, laws, and regulations, or
adjudication in tribal courts.146 This is an interesting concern considering
that this same question does not arise in instances where an individual
from out-of-state is subject to a particular state’s courts and that state’s
criminal, contract, or tort law, for example.147 Furthermore, the rules of
procedure outside of the tribal court system may not be as consistent
between forums as the Supreme Court would assume.148 Research has
indicated that procedures can vary widely between state courts, between
state and federal courts, and even amongst federal courts.149 Many of
143. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 35, 40-43; Brief for Petitioners at 3940, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
144. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 40.
145. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 375-86 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring); David H.
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian
Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1595 (1996).
146. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008).
147. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119-21 (2014); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Super. Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 105-08, 112-16 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 463-64, 485-86 (1985).
148. See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85 (Souter, J., concurring); Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 5, at 11-12. In expressing concern over the tribal courts’ apparent inconsistencies and
abnormalities in procedures, the Supreme Court often holds the tribal courts up to a standard level
of procedural fairness that can only be attained, in the view of the Court, in state or federal courts.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 11-12.
149. See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice,
90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2012); Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural
Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1181, 1218-29 (2011). For an indication of how procedural rules may vary between federal courts,
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these procedural differences may be outcome determinative.150
Furthermore, the criticisms that tribal courts repeatedly face, that they
are incompetent or unfair, are the very same criticisms that plague the
state courts of Mississippi, Alabama, and West Virginia.151 However,
unlike those courts, the tribal courts are the only ones whose
adjudicative jurisdiction is at risk.152
Another concern of the Court, in the words of Justice Souter and
later, Justice Breyer,153 is the lack of any effective review mechanism for
the tribal courts’ decisions.154 But this is somewhat of an
overstatement.155 Although it is true that there is no removal mechanism
from tribal court to federal court, nor are tribal judgments themselves
directly appealable to state or federal court, once a non-member
individual has exhausted proceedings in the tribal courts, there are a
variety of means by which the tribal judgment may be reviewed.156
Yet, paradoxically, several Justices have expressed greater
uncertainty about subjecting non-Indians to tribal laws and regulations,
which drastically differ from the procedures of their own courts without
their consent, than subjecting an individual to the procedures of a
different state or even country.157 According to Justice O’Connor, for
instance, most of the tribal judicial systems’ roots cannot be traced to
tradition; rather, many of the courts may actually be attributed to the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.158 At the time the Act was passed,
the tribes were already familiar with the procedures employed by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, and as such, those regulations and procedures

or even within one single federal court, compare S.D. & E.D.N.Y. R. 11.1 (stating the requirements
for pleadings, motions, and other papers), and N.D.N.Y. R. 10.1 (same), with Thomas McAvoy,
Senior U.S. District Judge, Standing Order on Extensions of Time to File Opposition Papers and
Reply Papers in All Motions Filed Pursuant to N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1 and 12.1 (Dec. 29, 2003),
http://www.nynd.uscourts.gov/sites/nynd/files/DAgostino_03142016.pdf.
150. See S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1027, 104144 (2014).
151. Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The
Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 32 (Harvard Univ. & John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Paper
No. RWP04-016, 2004). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has ranked those state courts as the worst
state court systems in the United States, based on judges’ competence, impartiality, and fairness. Id.
152. Id. at 32.
153. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring).
154. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 16-17.
155. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
156. See Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court
Decisions, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 241, 254-80 (1998); Sixkiller, supra note 103, at 795.
157. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 32837 (2008); Hicks, 533 U.S. at 375-86 (Souter, J., concurring).
158. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 U.
TULSA L.J. 1, 1-2 (1997); see Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461–749 (2012)).
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laid the foundation for most of the tribal courts’ structure.159 It is
well worth noting that the tribal governments are required to have
not only their laws,160 but also their procedures approved and regulated
by the federal government.161 What, then, is the real concern of the
Supreme Court?
In the past, the Court had held that non-member parties cannot
allege the general “incompetence” of tribal courts as a means of
escaping their jurisdiction, as that would run directly contrary to the
congressional policy of promoting tribal courts’ development.162 In fact,
the Court indicated that the provisions of the ICRA specifically
protected non-Indians against any unfair treatment in tribal courts.163
During oral argument in Dollar General, Justice Breyer seemed to
indicate just that.164 Where the procedures appeared to be “normal,”
likely meaning the procedures were modeled after many of the
procedures in state and federal court rather than the traditions of the
tribes, the non-members ought to be subject to tribal jurisdiction; where
the procedures appeared to be unfair to non-members, the non-member
party could complain to the appellate court that there was a lack of due
process rather than contest the very existence of jurisdiction.165 Dollar
General argued that in general, the Constitution does not apply in tribal
courts, that there is no automatic appeal to non-tribal courts, that tribal
law includes unwritten traditional tribal customs, and as such, nonmembers face disadvantages in tribal courts based solely on the fact that
they are non-members.166 It is worth noting that none of these arguments
would fly if brought before any other recognized sovereign nation.167
D. In the Grand Scheme of Tribal Jurisdiction, Dollar General Has
Done Nothing to Resolve Confusion
After a lengthy six-month and seventeen-day wait, the Supreme
Court issued a per curiam ruling in Dollar General, affirming the Fifth
159. O’Connor, supra note 158, at 2.
160. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (requiring approval by the Secretary of the Interior of tribal
constitutions).
161. Id. §§ 1301–41.
162. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
163. Id. Of course, the Court still maintained that the jurisdiction of the tribal courts was
ultimately subject to review by the federal courts. Id.
164. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 11-12.
165. See id. Justice Breyer also mentioned that were a party subject to the “terribly unfair”
procedures of a particular state or a foreign country, the party could only complain that they did not
receive proper due process; the party could not argue that the state or foreign country did not have
the power to exercise jurisdiction in general. Id. at 12.
166. Feldman, supra note 130.
167. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss1/17

20

McDonald: A Dollar For Your Thoughts: <i>Dollar General</i> and the Supreme

2017]

A DOLLAR FOR YOUR THOUGHTS

419

Circuit’s decision by default after a four-to-four vote.168 For now, the
ability of the tribes’ to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members
relates to some primitive notions about personal jurisdiction: that parties
may generally be sued where they do business.169 Yet, as Justice Thomas
pointed out, unless the Court thoroughly re-examines the foundation of
its logic in tribal sovereignty cases, the Court will continue to be haunted
by confusion in future cases.170
A common theme that has developed in these civil divestiture cases
is the Court’s reluctance to declare finally, one way or another, whether
the tribes may assert any manner of civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.171 But, in every case that has come before the Court, the Court
has never ruled in favor of tribal jurisdiction, even where the facts of the
case seem to fit into one of the two exceptions identified to the general
rule that the tribes cannot exercise adjudicatory authority over nonmembers.172 The problem is that despite the presence of such facts, the
Court has in each tribal civil jurisdiction case since then further
elaborated on these exceptions and narrowed them in such a way that
almost no activity of non-members could invoke tribal civil
jurisdiction.173 It seemed that Dollar General’s activity clearly fell within
the first exception identified in Montana, since the company had entered
into a consensual commercial relationship with the tribe and its members
through a lease.174
Ultimately, the Court’s troubles with federal Indian law stems from
the fact that the very foundation of its precedent cannot be traced to any
part of the Constitution.175 When Congress began to legislate over tribal
affairs and the constitutionality of these acts were challenged, the Court
was forced to examine how it was that federal law could be applied to
the internal affairs of tribes.176 Thus, the implicit divestiture doctrine was
168. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159, 2160 (2016);
Ed Gehres, Opinion Analysis: Dollar General, the Court’s Longest Pending Case of the 2015
Term Is a Four-Four Per Curiam Opinion, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2016, 9:28AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-dollar-general-the-courts-longest-pendingcase-of-the-2015-term-is-a-four-four-per-curiam-opinion.
169. Nagele-Piazza, supra note 17.
170. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-15, 226 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
171. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330
(2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358-60 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
457-59 (1997).
172. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 320; Hicks, 533 U.S. at 374; Strate, 520
U.S. at 438, 457-59; Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18-20 (1987); Nat’l Farmers Union
Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-57 (1985).
173. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 330 (holding that neither Montana
exception applied); Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-59 (same).
174. See Gehres, supra note 168.
175. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886).
176. See id. at 379-80, 382.
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created, where in some cases, the tribes retained the authority to exercise
jurisdiction over non-members unless that authority was expressly taken
away by Congress, and in others, the tribes could not exercise
jurisdiction over non-members at all, except where the two Montana
exceptions were involved.177 When convenient, the Court could narrow
even these instances.178 For example, the Court conflated the two
Montana exceptions in a later case when it held that tribal governments
could only regulate non-member conduct inside the reservation when the
tribe’s sovereign interests were implicated, to the extent necessary to
protect tribal self-government and control internal relations.179 In
addition, given how recent tribal cases have been decided, the Court’s
attempt to distinguish between the tribes’ legislative jurisdiction and
their adjudicatory jurisdiction is both puzzling and unworkable.180
E. Ramifications for the Tribes and Non-Member Individuals Engaged
in Contractual Relationships with the Tribes
Unfortunately, after more than a decade, jurisdictional ambiguities
between tribes and non-member businesses are little improved from
where they were at the outset.181 Of course, as a result of the four-to-four
split, the Choctaw tribe could claim a victory: for now, the tribes could
still exercise civil jurisdiction over tort claims brought by tribe members
against non-member businesses operating on tribal land. Nevertheless,
the uncertainty resulting from the still unanswered questions remains.182
This Subpart first explains how the Court’s floundering on tribal
jurisdiction has helped to undermine the tribes’ sovereignty and has left
the tribal courts’ uncertain of their own existence in the future.183 This
Subpart then discusses how, on the flipside, the Court’s insistence upon
protecting the personal liberties of non-members has actually created
more uncertainty for non-member businesses seeking to do business on
tribal lands.184 In the long run, significant costs will be incurred for
both parties.185

177. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 327-30.
178. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
179. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 332.
180. Florey, supra note 58, at 1543-49 (explaining how the tribes’ two powers cannot really be
coextensive in their application to non-members); see supra Part II.B–C.
181. See Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159, 2160 (2016)
(per curiam).
182. See supra Part III.B–D.
183. See infra Part III.E.1.
184. See infra Part III.E.2.
185. See infra Part III.E.
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1. Impact on Tribal Sovereignty
Tribal governments entering into contracts with commercial
businesses will be wary that should any issues arise, whether it be a tort
claim or otherwise, the business will still be able to take advantage of
the argument used by Dollar General: that tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction
does not extend to non-members.186 As explained in National Farmers,
the Supreme Court is still required to carefully examine the relevant
statutes, policies of the executive branch as embodied in treaties, and
administrative and judicial decisions when determining the existence
and extent of the tribal courts’ civil jurisdiction.187 However, as
legal scholars and historians have indicated, the Supreme Court
often interprets these sources out of their proper historical context.188
The uncertainty in the Court’s civil divestiture jurisprudence
has the tendency to produce unfortunate results, such as in
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
which held that tribes’ ability to zone tribal lands could not be extended
to fee lands, resulting in an “impractical pattern of checkerboard
jurisdiction.”189 These unworkable rules make it difficult for the tribes to
act as a sovereign entity to any certain extent.190
There is a long line of precedent establishing that the tribes have
inherent sovereignty.191 But, according to Manley Begay, of the Harvard
Project on American Indian Economic Development research group,
there are three aspects of sovereignty: inherent, legal, and de facto; and
the federal government has not for the most part, recognized any of these
forms.192 The United States government already took a step toward
honoring the tribes’ de facto sovereignty with the passage of the Indian
Self-Determination Act of 1975.193 Nevertheless, the line of precedent
from the Supreme Court since Montana indicates that the tribal

186. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 3.
187. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1977).
188. For perspectives on how the Court has misinterpreted some of the statutes and treaties
throughout history, see Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 448-68 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
569-81 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); and see also Brief for Amici Curiae Historians and Legal
Scholars, supra note 132, at 8-20.
189. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 435 U.S. 463, 478 (1976) (internal quotations omitted)).
190. See supra Part II.E.1.
191. See supra Part II.A.
192. Gambling on Nation-Building, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7–13, 2012, at 35; see Kalt & Singer,
supra note 151, at 6 (defining the various aspects of sovereignty and the tribes’ struggle to achieve
de facto sovereignty).
193. Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012)). This Act
began the transfer of administration over the tribes’ internal affairs from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to the tribal governments themselves. See id.
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governments are still fighting for their sovereignty to be truly recognized
in the legal sense.194 Furthermore, according to Chief Justice Roberts in
Plains Commerce, the tribe bears the burden of establishing that its
regulatory and adjudicatory authority over non-members falls within one
of the two exceptions laid out in Montana.195 With every decision that
removes the tribal courts’ ability to adjudicate matters of tribal law, that
power is shifted to non-tribal courts, which ultimately infringes upon the
tribes’ lawmaking authority because while they can create their own
regulations, they cannot enforce them.196
2. Impact on Commercial Businesses and Other Non-Members
The amount of land designated as belonging to federally recognized
tribes is quite extensive and it is naïve to think that commercial
businesses, such as Dollar General, will not continue to seek out new
opportunities on these lands and enter into consensual relationships with
the tribes.197 As stated above, in Montana, the Supreme Court identified
two exceptions to the general presumption that tribal courts could not
assert civil jurisdiction over non-members on tribal land.198 With the
outcome in Dollar General, non-member businesses and individuals
alike may be uncertain as to which activities may subject them to tribal
jurisdiction, including when they hire tribal members, enter into
contracts with the tribe, or sign leases on tribal land.199
It took roughly thirteen years for Dollar General’s $2.5 million civil
suit to make it to the Supreme Court, and its resolution offered no
opinion to guide Dollar General or any other company operating on
tribal lands in any future interactions.200 For now, companies will have
to be wary, though the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding tribal courts’
authority to adjudicate tribal member claims against non-member
businesses is the first decision to ever rule in favor of such
jurisdiction.201 The amount of money at stake is considerable: nonmembers represent billions in business through contractual relationships
and commercial leases with the tribes each year.202 Non-member
194. As mentioned earlier, the Court has not upheld tribal civil jurisdiction in any of its civil
divestiture cases. See supra Part II.B.
195. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008).
196. Miller, supra note 5, at 1842-43.
197. See supra Part II.B–C.
198. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-67 (1981).
199. See supra Part III.
200. Vann R. Newkirk II, The U.S. Supreme Court Leaves Tribal Authority Intact,
ATLANTIC (June 23, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/supreme-courtchoctaw-indian/488393.
201. Id.
202. Feldman, supra note 130.
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businesses especially would be well advised to educate themselves as to
tribal regulations relating to employment, especially where these
regulations differ from those of the state and the federal government. 203
If businesses are not careful to adapt to these policy differences, like
Dollar General, they might be exposed to significant litigation in
the future.204
In a more abstract sense, there is indeed an intangible price to pay
for non-Indian businesses and individuals alike when the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts interfere with tribal civil jurisdiction and the
tribes’ sovereignty despite the interference lacking a sufficient basis in
both constitutional and international principles of law.205 Professor
Milner Ball stated as follows:
Because we say we have a government of laws and not men, we hold
our government to be limited and to have no unlimited power. If the
federal government nevertheless exercises unrestrained power over
Indian nations, then what we say is not true, and we have a different
kind of government than we think we have. . . . The Court is regarded
as the institution of restraint and a protector of rights. 206

If the Court interferes with the sovereignty of the tribes, then the Court
will continue to act in contradiction to its purported position in the
federal government, something that negatively impacts the tribes and
non-Indians alike.207
IV.

RESOLVING THE SUPREME COURT’S NATIVE AMERICAN DILEMMA

For the hundreds of tribes in the United States, and the nearly 200
tribal courts currently operating, tribal sovereignty itself hangs in the
balance of these Supreme Court decisions.208 Even more importantly, it
is necessary to find a solution that will help restore some of the tribes’
authority over their land and those who choose to live or work on it.209
Pushing power back into the hands of the tribes will require a solution
that will convince a Supreme Court that has frequently been averse to
recognizing tribal power that the tribes can exercise their regulatory and
adjudicatory authority over non-members in their territory in a way that

203. See Nagele-Piazza, supra note 17.
204. See id.
205. See supra Part III.E.
206. Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 61
(1987).
207. See supra Part III.B–E.
208. See Garrett Epps, Who Can Tribal Courts Try?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/who-can-tribal-courts-try/419037.
209. See supra Part III.B–E.
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will satisfy constitutional due process.210 Subpart A first examines how a
full Supreme Court bench ought to have decided Dollar General.211
Next, Subpart B recommends the analysis that should be adopted in
future cases dealing with tribal civil jurisdiction.212
A. How Dollar General Should Have Been Decided
If the Supreme Court had a full bench, the Court should have ruled
against Dollar General by holding that tribal courts may indeed exercise
jurisdiction in civil cases involving non-members.213 Of course, this
would have led to the same result (an affirmation of the Fifth Circuit’s
decision), but with an opinion that would hopefully offer some guidance
to lower federal courts in future tribal jurisdiction cases.214 Dollar
General incorrectly assumed, and argued, that the tribes have no inherent
adjudicatory authority; rather, any authority they do have is based upon
consent.215 Further, Dollar General appeared to argue that the tribes did
not even have the regulatory authority over the type of dispute.216 In
other words, the tribes did not have the power to create regulations or
legislation regarding tort law, nor enforce those regulations, on their
own land.217
Assuming, arguendo, that the Supreme Court would not have
abandoned any of its civil divestiture precedents, and instead would have
decided the narrower question whether tribal courts may exercise civil
adjudicative jurisdiction over non-member defendant businesses
operating pursuant to commercial leases on tribal trust lands, the Court
still ought to have ruled against Dollar General.218 Although some
Justices have argued against it, the Supreme Court’s precedent in civil
divestiture cases often focuses first on the nature of the land where the
claims are based.219 In the Dollar General case, the non-member
210. L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkinson and Hicks,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 675 (2003).
211. See infra Part IV.A.
212. See infra Part IV.B.
213. See infra Part IV.A.
214. See Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159, 2160 (2016)
(per curiam).
215. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 4-5; supra Part II.A.
216. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 6-7.
217. Id. at 4-7.
218. Dollar Gen. Corp., 136 S. Ct. at 2160. Of course, the Court did ultimately affirm the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling against Dollar General by default via a four-to-four split, but for this portion of the
Note, the full bench would have afforded a full opinion. See id.; Brendan I. Koerner, What
Happens in a SCOUTS Tie?, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2016, 6:50 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/explainer/2004/11/what_happens_in_ascotus_tie.html.
219. See LaVelle, supra note 47, at 746-69 (providing an in-depth discussion of the Court’s
long line of civil divestiture cases and how land status in particular contributed to the nuances of
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activities involved took place on tribal trust lands.220 The Court has
never extended its Montana “presumption” against tribal adjudicative
authority over non-member activity taking place on actual tribal trust
lands within the reservation.221 The Court itself has indicated that a nonmember business employing tribal members on tribal land is precisely
the sort of activity that would fall within the first Montana exception.222
Furthermore, the Court agreed that while the Montana rule applied both
in situations involving land owned by non-members and tribal-owned
land (as was the case in Dollar General),223 the fact that land
is owned by or held in trust for the tribes is a significant, sometimes
dispositive factor.224
Although there was indeed a treaty signed with the Choctaw Nation
removing the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over non-members on tribal
land, in 1855, Attorney General Caleb Cushing stated that the United
States did not reserve by treaty civil jurisdiction over non-members’
activities on tribal land.225 Furthermore, there were later treaties signed
between the Choctaw Nation and the United States that reserved for the
tribes the authority to exercise jurisdiction over “persons other than
Indians and members of said tribes or nations.”226 Dollar General’s
argument that the tribal courts cannot have adjudicatory power over tort
claims is also patently false.227 In Hicks, the Court recognized that “there
was little doubt that the tribal court had jurisdiction over []
tort claims,” until that jurisdiction was affirmatively withdrawn by
Congress.228 Given these factors, the Court should have affirmed the
Fifth Circuit’s decision.229

each decision). For instance, the Court’s analysis has differed when the lands are non-Indian fee
lands, fee lands owned by tribal members, or tribal lands held in trust by the United States, and
whether the lands are open or closed-area reservations. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438, 454-57 (1997) (discussing the importance of land status and its impact on tribal authority over
non-member activity under the Montana analysis); Sixkiller, supra note 103, at 790-95.
220. Gehres, supra note 168.
221. Sixkiller, supra note 103, at 796-97.
222. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 334-35
(2008).
223. See Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 175 (5th Cir.
2014), cert. granted sub nom., Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 125 S. Ct. 2833
(2015), aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016); supra note 114 and accompanying text.
224. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 370-71 (2001).
225. See Brief for Amici Curiae Historians and Legal Scholars, supra note 132, at 22-23.
226. Id. at 24-25 (quoting Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, 14 Stat. 772, art. 8, 14
Stat. 769, 772 (1866)).
227. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 131, at
19-20.
228. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 368.
229. See supra Part IV.A.
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B. Reconfiguring the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Comport with
International Law Principles
As indicated above, the implicit divestiture doctrine has continued
to prove a thorn in the Supreme Court’s paw; a messy and inconsistently
applied, judicially created doctrine with a flimsy constitutional
foundation.230 Not only has it been criticized by historians and legal
scholars, it has also been questioned by members of the Court itself.231
In 1989, Justice Blackmun delivered a lengthy dissent, and his reasoning
in this dissent should be adopted by the Court when dealing with future
tribal civil jurisdiction cases.232 This would of course entail another
reversal by the Court, but this reversal would help avoid any confusion
in the future.233
In Brendale, Justice Blackmun declared that the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding tribal civil jurisdiction had lost its way.234
Following Justice Blackmun’s interpretation would not only comport
with principles of international law as well as the historical relationship
between the tribes and the federal government, it would also preserve the
Court’s jurisprudence in Montana.235 In Brendale, the Court failed to
muster a majority to determine whether the Yakima Nation possessed
the inherent authority to pass zoning laws regulating non-members’ use
of lands within reservation territory.236 Justice Blackmun argued not that
Montana should, but must be read to recognize that whenever nonmember conduct on reservation lands impacted or threatened a
significant tribal interest, that non-member conduct may be regulated by
the tribe (including enforcement of the regulation by tribal courts).237
Justice Blackmun relied in particular on Marshall’s Cherokee
Cases238 and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 448-68 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); Florey, supra note 60, at 1542-49;
LaVelle, supra note 47, at 746-76; McSloy, supra note 22, at 252-80.
232. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 448-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
233. See supra Part II.B–C.
234. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 449-51(Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (“From this Court’s
earliest jurisprudence immediately after the American Revolution, it followed the settled
understanding of international law that the sovereignty of the individual tribes . . . survived their
incorporation within the United States, except as necessarily diminished.”).
235. See id. at 449-57. Justice Blackmun pointed out that the 150 years of Indian law
jurisprudence established the opposite “general principle” from what the majority was indicating,
and that interpreting Montana without due consideration to the rich and extensive history of
interaction between the United States and the tribes would lead the Court astray. Id. at 450-51.
236. See id. at 414 (majority opinion).
237. Id. at 449-50, 456-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
238. Cherokee Indian Cases, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/antebellum/
landmark_cherokee.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
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Reservation.239 The fundamental principle in Chief Justice Marshall’s
reasoning—a principle that has been a consistent aspect of the Court’s
Indian law jurisprudence—is that the tribes were divested of sovereignty
only to the extent that that sovereignty was inconsistent with the United
States’ paramount authority.240 Colville reflected this principle as well:
the tribes’ authority was implicitly divested only when the exercise of its
authority would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the
national government, such as criminal jurisdiction over non-members.241
In spite of the Court’s holding in Oliphant, Justice Blackmun argues,
Colville expressly established that nothing in the earlier case negated the
Court’s “historical understanding that the tribes retain substantial civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians.”242
Relying on Justice Blackmun’s dissent as the foundation of future
civil divestiture jurisprudence would require some backtracking, but not
a complete overhaul of the jurisprudence as it exists today.243 First, the
opinion explicitly states that the Montana rule would not be abandoned
because in general, it was consistent with the Court’s Indian law
jurisprudence despite containing some language “flatly inconsistent”
with the Court’s earlier decisions defining the scope of inherent tribal
jurisdiction.244 The Hicks ruling, for example, could be limited in its
application to protecting state and federal government officials
acting in their official capacity from being subjected to the tribes’
civil jurisdiction.245
Second, the dissent’s analysis goes further in comporting with
principles of international law because it recognizes the tribes’ inherent
sovereignty and would do more to protect that sovereignty.246
515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
239. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
240. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 451-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
241. See id. at 452 (quoting Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at
153-54). The Court provided a few examples of when the tribes’ sovereignty was necessarily
divested, such as “when the tribes seek to engage in foreign relations, alienate their lands to nonIndians without federal consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts.” Id. In fact, the only other
power that the Court had deemed to be divested upon incorporation into the United States since the
Cherokee Cases was the ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 453;
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
242. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 453-54, 454 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (referring to the
Department of the Interior’s administrative opinion regarding the extent of the tribes’ powers over
tribe members and non-members alike in their territory regardless of land ownership).
243. See supra Part II.B–C.
244. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 455-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
245. See generally Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
246. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 451 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he settled doctrine of
the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence—its right to selfgovernment, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection.” (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) at 560-61)).
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International law, ever-changing and developing, only falls more in
favor of the tribes as time goes by.247 Two of the fundamental principles
of international law, self-determination and sovereignty, have been
deemed the most important of all human rights by the tribes, and the two
go hand in hand.248 The Declaration on the of Rights of Indigenous
Peoples,249 while not legally binding, has generally been recognized as
representing the “dynamic development of international legal norms”
reflecting the commitment of the 145 endorsing states to move forward
with recognizing the principles embodied within the declaration.250 One
of the fundamental principles embodied in the Declaration is the
entitlement of the tribes to self-determination under international law.251
Yet, the Court’s current jurisprudence where the tribes’ civil jurisdiction
is concerned impedes, rather than promotes, the tribes’ sovereignty.252
The Court has essentially defined a treaty as a “contract between
two or more independent nations.”253 Over the years, corresponding
methods of treaty interpretation with respect to treaties established with
the Indian tribes have developed, often with respect for the tribes’
sovereignty kept in mind.254 Justice Blackmun incorporates these canons
of construction into his dissents in order to examine the traditional
relationship between the federal government and the tribes.255 Under
247. See Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation:
Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 588-621
(1987). For example, the United Nations created a permanent Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, and after more than a decade of work, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples was adopted. Historical Overview, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/
development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples/historicaloverview.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
248. G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, art. 7 ¶ 3 (Sept. 13, 2007).
249. S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality
Rights Claims, 75 IOWA L. REV. 837, 838-44 (1990).
250. Frequently Asked Questions: Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf (last
visited Nov. 15, 2017). The United States was at first one of four countries objecting to the
Declaration, but it became the last major country to sign onto the Declaration when former
President Obama announced his support of the Declaration in 2010. Krissah Thompson, U.S. Will
Sign U.N. Declaration on Rights of Native People, Obama Tells Tribes, WASH. POST
(Dec. 16, 2010, 12:10 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/
AR2010121603136.html.
251. Stefania Errico, The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An
Overview, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 741, 745-54 (2007).
252. See supra Parts II–III.
253. James J. Lenoir, Comment, Treaties and the Supreme Court, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 603
(1934) (emphasis added). In the case of the United States, a contract that was created by conforming
to the Constitutional requirements concerning treaty-making. Id. at 604.
254. See supra Part II.
255. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 569-81 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in
part). For example, Justice Blackmun reviewed evidence of the intention of the United States as a
party to the treaty with the Crow Tribe with respect to possession of the Big Horn River. Id. at 570-

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss1/17

30

McDonald: A Dollar For Your Thoughts: <i>Dollar General</i> and the Supreme

2017]

A DOLLAR FOR YOUR THOUGHTS

429

these canons, the courts should presume Congress’s intent to protect the
rights of the tribes and therefore, treaties are construed liberally in favor
of the tribes, as the tribes would have understood them.256 Thus,
although the tribes would still bear the burden of showing that some
right or interest was affected by the non-member conduct, given the
favorable reading of any treaties and historical context, this would not be
a particularly difficult burden to bear.257
As for the Court’s underlying concern with fair treatment for nonmembers in tribal courts, this is the opportune area of jurisprudence in
which the Court should show some judicial restraint.258 According to
Supreme Court precedent, Congress has the plenary power, however
inconsistent with international law it may be, to remove the tribes’ civil
jurisdiction entirely.259 Additionally, Congress could have created
federal court review for tribal court decisions or a removal procedure for
non-members to use, but has refrained from doing so.260 The Court
should hesitate to step in where Congress has not even identified a
problem.261 In any event, non-member parties still have recourse; the
failure of a tribal court to provide appropriate due process would likely
prevent the plaintiff from having the tribal court’s judgment recognized
and enforced in a state or federal court.262

77. Considering how the aim of the treaty was to provide the tribe with a certain area of land to
develop agriculturally with the recognition that much of their natural resources were being depleted,
while at the same time obtaining the tribe’s territory outside of the reservation, Justice Blackmun
believed it both “inconceivable” and inconsistent with the purposes of the treaty that the United
States intended to remove the tribe’s possession of the riverbed. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting in
part).
256. Allison M. Dussias, Heeding the Demands of Justice: Justice Blackmun’s Indian Law
Opinions, 71 N.D. L. REV. 41, 132 (1995). Justice Blackmun was not the first Justice to recommend
extending use of the Court’s canons of construction to treaties between the federal government and
the tribes; Justice Douglas noted in his dissent in the Affiliated Ute Citizens case (the majority
opinion was written by Justice Blackmun) that the canons of construction should be applied to both
treaties and legislation where the tribes are concerned. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 161 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). Justice Douglas stated: “We owe to the
Indians a beneficent interpretation of remedial legislation designed to right past wrongs.” Id. (citing
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886)). As such, “doubtful expressions . . . are to
be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless people.” Id. (quoting Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,
675 (1912)).
257. See Dussias, supra note 256, at 108.
258. Kalt & Singer, supra note 151, at 20.
259. See id. at 20; Part II.A–C.
260. See Kalt & Singer, supra note 151, at 20.
261. See id.
262. See, e.g., Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that tribal court’s judgment was not entitled to recognition because its proceedings violated due
process).
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CONCLUSION

As Justice Black once said, “Great nations, like great men, should
keep their word.”263 The Court has recognized that the tribal courts’ civil
jurisdiction over non-members is a fundamental aspect of tribal
sovereignty, yet the Court has not once shown its support for tribal
authority, making the Court’s own words seem hollow.264 Even in cases
where tribal jurisdiction seems to fit perfectly within one of the Montana
exceptions, the Court has increasingly encroached on tribal authority
over its own land.265 In Dollar General the tribal courts narrowly
avoided what seemed to be the pinnacle of civil divestiture: a holding
that would prevent tribal courts from exercising jurisdiction over nonmember businesses with both leases and contracts with the tribal
government whose employees attack tribal youth on tribal trust lands.266
Neither history nor text of the Constitution work in the Court’s
favor.267 The moment the federal government began treating the tribes as
wards, a matter of internal affairs, rather than as independent sovereign
entities, a matter of external or foreign affairs, was the moment the
government was led astray.268 As such, the Court was left with little
choice other than to invent a new means of assessing the legitimacy of
congressional action relating to Indian affairs: the implicit divestiture
doctrine.269 However, even with this doctrine, it was only within the past
few decades that the Court began to use it as a means of significantly
narrowing the tribes’ civil jurisdiction.270
With the support of both the legislative and executive branches of
government, states, lawyers, and academics for the competence of the
tribal courts and the tribes’ inherent sovereignty, the Court’s (or, more
accurately, four Justices’) lone, bold stance against the tribes is odd.271
Republicans and Democrats alike in the presidency and in either house
of Congress have supported the broader policy of self-determination and

263. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Black delivered a scathing dissent when the Court upheld actions of the federal
government that violated its treaty with the Tuscarora Tribe and led to the government’s
expropriating significant amounts of tribal land. Id.
264. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987); supra Parts II–III.
265. See supra Part III.A. See generally Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle
Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (holding that neither Montana exception applied).
266. See Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159, 2160 (2016)
(per curiam).
267. See supra Part II.A–B.
268. See supra Part II.A.
269. See supra Part II.A–B.
270. See supra Part II.B–C.
271. Kalt & Singer, supra note 149, at 19-21, 25-29; Sixkiller, supra note 103, at 809-11.
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tribal sovereignty.272 The Court’s stance is especially concerning given
the United States’ recent change in position on the Declaration of the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.273
Turning toward Justice Blackmun’s analysis of the Montana
decision would, however, help to resolve some of the confusion in the
Court’s civil divestiture jurisprudence, and at the same time would help
preserve the tribes’ sovereignty.274 Additionally, adopting his analysis
would comport with principles of international law as it encourages the
Court to engage in a more thorough analysis of the historical context of
the treaties that the federal government has entered into with the tribes as
sovereign entities.275 If the federal government is really concerned with
respecting its policy of self-determination and tribal sovereignty, it
should be reflected in the actions of all three of its branches.276 In
another recent decision by the Court, Justice Thomas both railed against
the Court’s tribal law precedents and subtly hinted at the vestiges of
something much darker in the past, stating that “until the Court rejects
the fiction that Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs,
our precedents will continue to be based on the paternalistic theory that
Congress must assume all-encompassing control over the ‘remnants of a
race’ for its own good.”277 His call for a change should be taken up by
the rest of the Court, but until the Court is willing to diverge from its
current path, the social and economic future of the tribes may depend on
their continuing to assert their now internationally recognized rights to
self-determination.278
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272. Kalt & Singer, supra note 149, at 25-29.
273. See Thompson, supra note 239.
274. See supra Part IV.B.
275. See supra Parts II.A, IV.B.
276. See supra Parts II.A, IV.B.
277. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968-69 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)).
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